The risky road to Rio+20, and what the summit actually left behind
· 8 min read · by Iris Calloway

Early in 2011, as diplomats met in New York for the first rounds of preparation for the UN Conference on Sustainable Development, a warning travelled through environmental and peasant networks, loudest in Latin America. The conference planned for Rio de Janeiro the following year, the argument went, would not seriously review what governments had done since the 1992 Earth Summit. It would instead promote a "green economy" shaped by and for large companies, and redesign the machinery of global environmental governance to suit it.
Rio+20 came and went in June 2012 and left little public memory. Yet several of the bodies that now organise the world's official talk about sustainability were created there, and the argument about pricing and trading nature, which the critics saw coming, has only grown. So the warning deserves a second look: what it got right, what it overstated, and what the summit actually produced.
What the conference was asked to do
The UN General Assembly set the terms in December 2009, in resolution 64/236. The conference was to secure renewed political commitment to sustainable development, assess progress and gaps in implementing earlier agreements, and address new and emerging challenges. It was given two themes: a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, and the institutional framework for sustainable development.
The first theme was a phrase in search of a definition. The UN Environment Programme offered one in February 2011 with a long report, Towards a Green Economy, which argued that investing around 2 per cent of global GDP a year across ten key sectors, from energy and buildings to farming and fisheries, could deliver growth with far less environmental damage. Running alongside it was The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity study, known as TEEB, led by Pavan Sukhdev, who came to it from Deutsche Bank. TEEB made the case for putting economic values on forests, wetlands and pollinators so that their loss would register in decisions.
Supporters saw this as overdue. Damage to nature had always been treated as free, and making it visible on balance sheets was one way to change behaviour. Critics saw the price tag on a mangrove as the first step towards selling it. Bolivia and some of its allies in the ALBA bloc were openly hostile to the green-economy framing. Many other developing countries were less hostile but wary, fearing the concept would be used to attach conditions to aid or to justify trade barriers against their exports.
The second theme sounded drier and mattered as much. The Commission on Sustainable Development, set up after 1992 to follow up Agenda 21, was widely regarded as a talking shop. The European Union and many African governments wanted to turn UNEP from a programme into a specialised agency, a "World Environment Organization" with real authority and a budget to match. Ideas for clustering the environmental treaties also circulated, including closer integration of the conventions on climate, biodiversity and desertification that trace their origins to the 1992 summit. To sceptics, a consolidated structure built around the green economy looked like a one-stop shop for companies seeking access to land, carbon and genetic resources.
How the text was closed
Rio+20's negotiating history is a familiar UN story. A "zero draft" of about twenty pages appeared in January 2012. Months of informal talks in New York swelled it with bracketed proposals, each bracket marking a sentence some delegation could not accept. The last preparatory meeting in Rio, in mid-June, ended with much still open. The Brazilian hosts then took the pen, produced a compromise and had it accepted on 19 June, before most heads of state and government arrived for the summit itself on 20 to 22 June.
That sequence mattered more than any speech. The leaders who came (and several from the largest economies did not) were handed a finished document, The Future We Want, which nobody was willing to reopen. Its 283 paragraphs were endorsed by the General Assembly the following month. A few kilometres away, in Flamengo Park, the parallel People's Summit made the case against the green economy to anyone who would listen, a group that by then no longer included the negotiators.
Environmental groups called the outcome weak, and on targets and money it was: no new binding commitments, no new financing. In hindsight, though, the text did more institutional work than it got credit for.
What came out of it
| Decision in The Future We Want | What followed |
|---|---|
| Start an intergovernmental process to agree Sustainable Development Goals | An Open Working Group, with 30 seats shared among about 70 countries, proposed 17 goals and 169 targets in 2014; the General Assembly adopted them in September 2015 |
| Replace the Commission on Sustainable Development with a universal High-Level Political Forum | The forum first met in September 2013; it now meets every July under ECOSOC and every four years at summit level |
| Strengthen UNEP, with universal membership of its governing body and firmer funding | The 58-member governing council became universal in 2013 and was renamed the UN Environment Assembly, which first met in Nairobi in June 2014 |
| Adopt a ten-year framework of programmes on sustainable consumption and production | Set up with a UNEP secretariat; it continues today as the One Planet network |
| Call the green economy one important tool among several, not a rigid set of rules | The label was overtaken by other vocabulary within a few years |
The SDG idea did not come from the big powers. It came mainly from Colombia, later joined by Guatemala, which proposed in 2011 that the successors to the Millennium Development Goals should be universal and rooted in the Rio agenda. That a mid-sized Latin American delegation set the development agenda for the next fifteen years is one of the less-told stories of the conference.
The UNEP outcome was a compromise. The agency was not made a specialised agency, which the EU had wanted and the United States, among others, resisted. It got universal membership, a firmer claim on the UN regular budget, and an assembly that has since become the place where governments argue about plastics, chemicals and, since 2019, geoengineering.
How the "green economy" aged
The phrase itself barely outlived the conference. International vocabulary moved on to "green growth" in OECD circles, then "low-carbon development", and after the Paris Agreement in 2015, "net zero". In biodiversity talks the current term is "nature-positive". UNEP kept a Partnership for Action on Green Economy running from 2013, but few ministers say "green economy" any more.
The idea behind the label did much better. The proposition that protecting nature can be financed by measuring it, valuing it and building markets around it now runs through a dozen forums. Article 6 of the Paris Agreement sets rules for countries trading emission reductions. The UN Statistical Commission adopted a standard for ecosystem accounting in 2021. The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, agreed in December 2022, aims to mobilise at least $200 billion a year for biodiversity by 2030 and lists offsets and biodiversity credits among the tools it wants encouraged. The Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures published its recommendations for companies in September 2023.
So the critics of 2011 were right about the main act. Where they were too pessimistic was on its speed and coherence. There was no single Rio framework that placed the conventions under the market; they were never merged, and they still have separate secretariats in Bonn and Montreal. The market approach spread piecemeal instead, and it has run into trouble of its own. In January 2023 a joint media investigation questioned whether most of the rainforest offsets certified by the largest voluntary standard represented real emission cuts, and confidence in parts of the voluntary carbon market has not recovered.
The warning also asked whose technologies a green economy would reward. Industry was already presenting new tools as part of the green transition: synthetic biology to turn plant matter into fuels and chemicals, nanomaterials, and large-scale climate interventions, often with little independent assessment. The firms best placed to sell them were already big. In agriculture they have grown bigger, as the concentration ratios for agribusiness show after the mergers of the late 2010s, a trend that was visible even in the 2007 seed-industry rankings.
Twelve years on
The institutions from Rio+20 exist, and they are busy. The High-Level Political Forum hears dozens of voluntary national reviews each July, in which governments report on their own SDG progress. The weakness is in the word voluntary: there is no peer review with consequences, and the forum's ministerial declarations rarely say anything governments have not said before. The UN's own mid-point assessment in 2023 found only a small share of SDG targets on track, and roughly a third stalled or going backwards since 2015.
The Environment Assembly has turned out to matter more than the governing council it replaced. In March 2022 it launched negotiations on a treaty to end plastic pollution. Its sixth session, which closed in Nairobi on 1 March 2024, showed its limits too: a proposal to study solar geoengineering collapsed when governments could not agree whether to assess the technology or rule it out.
The next test is the Summit of the Future, due at the General Assembly in September 2024, where governments are once again being asked to reform the machinery of global cooperation. Rio+20 offers a useful caution for anyone watching. The big themes announced in advance dominate the commentary. What lasts tends to be procedural: which forum gets created, who sits in it, what it may decide and who pays for it. Those decisions settle, years later, whose interests get a hearing and who is left carrying the risk.




