The cool, the concerned and everyone else: public voice in synthetic biology
· 8 min read · by Samir Haddad

In June 2007, at the Synthetic Biology 3.0 conference in Zurich, one of the speakers, an ethicist, offered a tidy way to sort the people in the hall. On one side were the cool: researchers, founders and students who found the idea of designing living things thrilling. On the other were the concerned: critics, ethicists and social scientists who found the same idea worrying, or at least worth arguing about. The phrase stuck because it was funny and because it matched, more or less, who sat where.
Seventeen years later the framing still fits a lot of argument about new technology. Gene editing, gene drives and AI each arrive with their own enthusiasts and critics, who mostly talk past each other. And each time, the picture leaves out the same group, which is nearly everybody.
Two tribes, and the people who weren't in the hall
The trouble with "the cool and the concerned" isn't that it was wrong. It's that it described a conversation among insiders. The cool had read the papers. So had most of the concerned, some of whom knew the science as well as the people doing it. Both groups had badges.
Missing were the people who would live with the results without ever hearing the words "synthetic biology". Around the time of the Zurich meeting, a philanthropically funded project was engineering yeast to make a precursor of artemisinin, the antimalarial normally extracted from sweet wormwood, a crop grown by farmers in Asia and Africa. The project bore directly on their incomes, yet they had no seat in the rooms where it was discussed. Nor did malaria patients, or the communities where engineered organisms might one day be released.
Look closely and the tribes blur, too. Plenty of synthetic biologists worried about misuse, some more than their critics did. Many critics were fascinated by the science. And "concerned" covered very different worries: bioterrorism, patents on basic biological parts, the economics of commodity crops, the moral status of made life. Bundling them together turned a set of arguments into a temperament. Temperaments are easier to dismiss.
The tomato question
For much of the late twentieth century, the standard explanation for public unease about science was that people didn't understand it. In Britain a 1985 Royal Society report on the public understanding of science set the tone, and survey researchers built quizzes to measure the gap. European surveys on biotechnology in the 1990s included a now-famous true-or-false item: ordinary tomatoes don't contain genes, but genetically modified ones do. A large share of respondents got it wrong or said they didn't know. The result was quoted for years as proof that the public needed educating before its views could count.
Sociologists of science came to call this assumption the deficit model. Worry is a symptom of ignorance; the cure is information. The model appeals to scientists because it locates the problem somewhere else. It also describes attitudes badly. Comparisons of survey data across many countries found only a modest link between scientific knowledge and support for science, and a weaker one for contested technologies such as GM food. People who knew more were not reliably calmer. Sometimes they were more worried, because they knew which questions to ask.
The case that shaped much of the critique came from the fells of Cumbria, in northern England. After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, fallout led the government to restrict the movement and sale of sheep from upland farms. Officials expected the restrictions to last a matter of weeks. Their forecasts relied on assumptions about radioactive caesium in soil that did not hold on acidic upland ground, where it stayed available to the grass. Restrictions remained on some farms for more than two decades. The sociologist Brian Wynne, who studied the episode, argued that the hill farmers' growing distrust was not ignorance. It was a reasonable response to experts who had been confidently wrong and had brushed aside what the farmers knew about their own land and flocks.
That lesson is uncomfortable for anyone who thinks better messaging will settle a dispute. Public skepticism is often a judgment about institutions and their track record, not a gap in a textbook.
What happens when you ask
By 2000 a House of Lords committee was urging British science to stop lecturing the public and start talking with it. The alternative to the deficit model is to ask people what they think, under conditions where they can weigh it properly. That has been tried more often than most debates admit.
Denmark's Board of Technology held its first consensus conference in 1987, on gene technology in industry and agriculture: a small panel of lay citizens read up on the subject, questioned experts in public and wrote its own recommendations. Citizens' juries, developed in the United States in the 1970s, work in a similar way, and British researchers and campaigners used them in the 2000s on GM crops and on nanotechnology.
Britain's biggest exercise, the government-funded GM Nation? debate of 2003, was looser, built around hundreds of open meetings whose participants largely chose themselves. Its organizers reported broad unease about GM crops, and one of their findings ran straight against the deficit model: the more deeply people engaged with the issues, the firmer their concerns became.
Synthetic biology got its own version in 2010, the same year a US research institute announced a bacterium running on a chemically synthesized genome. Two of Britain's research councils, with support from the government-funded Sciencewise program, commissioned a public dialogue on the field. Members of the public in several cities met scientists and other specialists and talked it through. They were not hostile. Many saw real promise, especially in medicine. But their support came with conditions, and their questions kept circling back to a few themes: what the work was for, who was doing it and why, who stood to gain, what else it might do, and how sure anyone could be. None of those is a knowledge-gap question. They are about purpose and power, and reviews of British public dialogues have found the same questions surfacing across GM crops, nanotechnology and geoengineering.
The bluntest way to ask is a vote. In November 2016 voters in Monroe County, Florida, answered a non-binding ballot question on whether to allow a trial release of genetically engineered mosquitoes meant to suppress the species that spreads dengue and Zika. The county as a whole said yes. Key Haven, the small community where the release was planned, said no, and the trial did not go ahead there. Releases began elsewhere in the Keys in 2021. Which public you count matters a great deal.
Polls, meanwhile, kept finding that most people had barely heard of synthetic biology; a 2010 Eurobarometer survey found that the large majority of Europeans had never come across the term. Low awareness is often treated as a blank page waiting for good messaging. The dialogues point somewhere else. Given time and information, people don't converge on enthusiasm. They converge on good questions.
The social scientist in the lab
Another approach brings the concerned inside. When the Human Genome Project began in 1990, it set aside a few percent of its budget for research on ethical, legal and social implications, known as ELSI. Synthetic biology tried to go further. A research center funded by the US National Science Foundation from 2006 included a "human practices" strand, led by anthropologists who were supposed to work alongside the engineers rather than comment from the sidelines. Within a few years the collaboration had broken down, and the anthropologists published their own account of why.
The phrase lived on in iGEM, the international student competition in synthetic biology. Teams are judged partly on human practices: talking to people who might use or be affected by their project, and showing how those conversations changed what they built. For thousands of students a year, it is a first lesson that a design brief has a social side.
It has limits. Human practices can shrink into a box to tick: an online survey, a chat with a friendly expert, an ethics slide at the end. An embedded social scientist is often paid from the project's budget and valued for being useful to it, which is not the same as being independent. Embedding critics is worthwhile when it changes what gets researched. When it mainly makes the research easier to defend, it is closer to public relations.
A better conversation, as of late 2024
On funding, the cool have mostly won since 2007. A 2022 US executive order made biotechnology and biomanufacturing a national priority, and in 2023 Britain's government named engineering biology as one of five critical technologies. Public engagement has not kept pace. In Europe the fight over deregulating plants made with new genomic techniques has been waged mainly through lobbying, rival polls and arguments about labels; as of November 2024 member states still hadn't agreed a common position. Nanotechnology had a wave of British engagement exercises in the mid-2000s, yet engineered nanomaterials still reached food and packaging with labels shoppers almost never see. And the most notorious act in recent gene technology, the birth of gene-edited twins in China announced in 2018, involved no public conversation at all.
So what would a better conversation look like? Roughly this:
- Start with purpose, not just risk. Ask what a technology is for, and who wants it, before arguing about whether it is safe enough.
- Hear the affected as well as the representative. A random sample of citizens is useful. So are the farmers, patients and neighbors who would carry specific costs.
- Promise a response. Say in advance which decisions a dialogue can influence, and report afterward what changed.
- Fund it at arm's length. Engagement paid for and run by a technology's promoters will tend to find support for it.
- Treat lasting unease as a finding. Worry that survives explanation is information, not a failed communications plan.
None of this is new; the Danes were doing it in 1987. The difficulty is that it is slow and hands some authority to people without credentials, which makes both tribes nervous. Enthusiasts fear delay. Critics fear that a dialogue will be used to bless a decision already made, and they are sometimes right.
The early attempts to write synthetic biology's rules from inside the field assumed the main question was which experts should hold the pen. The two-tribes joke assumed the main divide was one of temperament. Both missed the larger gap, which was never between the cool and the concerned. It was between everyone with a conference badge and everyone without one.




